

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Contingency Memos

Executive Order

83-1099/2

FROM: Herbert E. Meyer
Vice Chairman, NIC
7 E 62, Hqs.

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

28 February 1983

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

[]

D DCI

9 March

WJ

2.

[]

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

25X1

25X1

25X1

DCI
EXEC
LEG

Executive Registry

83-1099/2

28 February 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT : Contingency Memos

1. You asked for a few additional examples that are sufficiently probable to justify this new format:

- Economic collapse in Romania leads to internal disorder and removal of Ceaucescu; a Soviet-sponsored successor regime re-instates Romania as a full military partner in the Warsaw Pact.
- The Soviets test a space-based laser prototype in 1983.
- A combination of astute Soviet political maneuvering, Pakistani disillusionment with its US relationship, and refugee pressures leads to a Pak-Soviet accommodation over Afghanistan on terms not to US liking.
- Arab oil producers begin dipping into reserves and cutting security and economic assistance funds for third countries including Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Jordan, Pakistan, and Lebanon.
- The Soviets prepare to deploy cruise or ballistic-missile submarines in the Caribbean, possibly based in Grenada, as an "analogous step" to US deployment in Europe of Pershing II missiles.

2. In each memo, we would identify the trend -- or note the possibility of the event -- then forecast its likely course and describe the implications.

3. To keep these contingency memos from becoming too academic, we would peg them to current intelligence. Note the first paragraph of the "Maronite State" memo, which points out that this old idea is once again being raised with US officials.

4. Thus we would not want too large an inventory of potential contingency memos. We would respond to new trends and possible events as they arise.

5. Publication of an average two contingency memos per month strikes me as about right.


Herbert E. Meyer

SECRET

Approved For Release 2008/12/08 : CIA-RDP88T00528R000100090001-2

Page Denied

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

25 February 1983

NOTE FOR: DCI

FROM : VC/NIC

SUBJECT : Contingency

1. Here for your consideration is a prototype of the new NIC product I told you about this morning.

2. My objective is to plug a gap in our product line. We need a vehicle through which to:

- identify a trend, or note the possibility of an event, then
- forecast its likely course and describe the implications.

3. These would be short papers, cleared by the NIC and the DCI. I doubt our publication rate would exceed two per month. Too many and we'd lose our impact. Besides, we're not that smart.

4. This particular piece is extremely good. It was written by [redacted] Charlie Waterman's assistant. I promised [redacted] that his piece would survive, even if the wrapper does not.

Hem

Herbert E. Meyer

Att: a/s

25X1
25X1

Page Denied

Next 12 Page(s) In Document Denied